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1Abstract
This manuscript presents an analysis of the regulation of transgenic plants that are engi-
neered to express pharmaceutical or industrial products (referred to throughout as “pharm”
plants). Pharm plants promise to facilitate the inexpensive production of a variety of spe-
cialty products. However, critics have questioned the adequacy of regulatory measures that
are intended to safeguard the food supply and the environment. Many pharm plants express
unusual products that have not previously entered the food supply, and in many instances the
products are intended to have pharmacological eﬀects in humans. The commingling of such
plants with food crops could have adverse eﬀects on the safety of the food supply. The current
regulatory system relies on processes that are intended to contain the pharm plants, prevent-
ing the commingling of pharm plants or their transgenes with food crops or wild plants.
A review of the literature on transgene spread, much of it garnered from ﬁeld experience
with the widely commercialized transgenic herbicide- and pest-resistant plants, illustrates
the inadequacy of such containment methods. More eﬀective, self-perpetuating biological
containment systems exist, but at present there is no eﬀort to gather the environmental and
food safety information that would provide a rational basis for determining the appropri-
ate level of containment. By requiring a pre-commercialization review of the environmental
and food safety hazards for each new pharm plant, regulatory agencies would be able to set
containment measures according to cost-beneﬁt principles. A pre-market review system will
provide sound risk predictions for food toxicity issues, but scientists’ abilities to predict en-
vironmental risks and food allergy risks are limited. A post-commercialization monitoring
system should be used to facilitate the detection of and response to unforseen adverse events.
By combining greater pre-commercialization review and post-commercialization monitoring,
regulatory agencies can achieve a greater degree of certainty and credibility.
2Introduction and Summary
Beginning with the open ﬁeld growth of the Flavr SavrTM tomato in 1992, the agricultural biotechnology
industry has engaged the world food supply in a grand experiment with transgenic plants.1 The Flavr
Savr tomato never took hold with consumers, but a host of engineered grain crops became available in the
mid-1990s. The widely adopted Roundup ReadyTM brand of soybeans contains a transgene that confers
resistance to the herbicide glyphosate. Pest-resistant varieties of corn contain a transgene for a protein toxin
of the bacterium Bacillus thuringensis (“Bt” toxin). Bt toxin conferred resistance to the European corn
borer. These grain crops were quickly followed by pest-resistant and herbicide-resistant cotton and canola
and pest-resistant papaya varieties.
This group of “ﬁrst generation” transgenic plants has been a commercial success. By 2001 over 60% of
soybean acres were planted with herbicide resistant soybeans, over 50% of cotton acres were planted with
herbicide tolerant varieties and about 20% of corn acres were planted with pest-resistant varieties.2 These
crops are also credited with a variety of economic, environmental and agronomic beneﬁts. The cultivation
of Roundup Ready soybeans has led to increased use of no-till or conservation tillage techniques that reduce
erosion and topsoil loss.3 By increasing the use of glyphosate, a relatively non-toxic and biodegradable
herbicide, Roundup Ready crops have decreased the use of more dangerous herbicides.4 Glyphosate resistant
canola, an oilseed crop also known as rapeseed, has been widely planted in the U.S. and Canada. A report
from the Canola Council of Canada found, “Clearly, the majority of growers surveyed believed that there
1Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo and William D. McBride, Adoption of Bioengineered Crops, Agricultural Economic Report No.
810, May, 2002.
2Id. at 1.
3Id. at 28.
4Id.
3are signiﬁcant advantages to transgenic canola. Participants in the survey and in the case studies stated
that their primary reason for adopting transgenic canola were not economic, but agronomic. The transgenic
system is simple, the weed control is early and eﬀective, and the system ﬁts well into a reduced or no-till
operation.”5
At the same time, transgenic plants have encountered strong consumer resistance, particularly in Europe
and Asia and in the American organic food market. Scientists and advocacy groups have expressed concerns
about possible health and environmental safety risks that might be impossible to reverse, particularly once
transgenic plants are spread throughout the agricultural system,.
For better or worse, the ﬁrst generation of transgenic plants appears to be inextricably lodged in the North
American food supply.6 A new, “second generation” of transgenic plants is under development, and some
such plants are now cultivated in open ﬁeld trials. Many of these second generation plants are the ﬁrst
eﬀorts of a new industry: instead of being grown for food, these plants have been engineered to produce
industrial or pharmaceutical products, including specialty oils, plastics, industrial enzymes, pharmaceutically
active proteins and vaccines.7 The plants are used as a kind of solar-powered manufacturing facility. This
technology has been dubbed “pharming”, and the advent of “pharm” plants has provided fresh vigor to the
debate surrounding transgenic plants.
Pharm plants hold the potential to revolutionize the manufacture of many raw materials and chemicals.
Some experts have predicted that the ﬁeld of vaccine development will be transformed by vaccine production
5An Agronomic and Economic Assessment of Transgenic Canola Prepared for the Canola Council of Canada Prepared
by: Serecon Management Consulting Inc. and Koch Paul Associates January 2001. Accessed at http://www.canola-
council.org/production/gmo toc.html.
6DavId Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get Little Choice, The New York Times, June 10, 2001.
7National Research Council, Environmental Eﬀects of Transgenic Plants: The Scope and Adequacy of Regulation, National
Academy Press, 2002 at 228.
4in transgenic crops. 8 Additionally, industry executives are hopeful that pharm plants will lower the cost
of production for therapeutically active proteins and provide nearly limitless manufacturing capacity.9 The
biotechnology industry is generating a host of highly selective protein-based drugs for the treatment of human
diseases. Protein drugs are presently manufactured in large fermentation vats containing mammalian cells
that are engineered to produce the desired protein.10 Fermentation is expensive and the worldwide capacity
for manufacturing protein-based drugs is expected to lag behind the demand for such drugs. Antibodies are
a commonly used type of protein drug. Industry estimates suggest that the cost of antibodies produced in
corn will be roughly one-eighth the cost of antibodies produced in bioreactors.11 It is possible that pharm
plants would decrease the cost of this quickly growing category of pharmaceutical agents.
At the same time, pharm plants pose substantial threats to the food supply. The ﬁrst generation of transgenic
plants, characterized by herbicide and pest-resistance traits, have not caused any clear damage to human
health or the environment.12 It is an entirely diﬀerent matter to consider the human health hazards presented
by a food plant, such as corn, engineered to express proteins that have a pharmaceutical eﬀect on humans.
Any commingling of corn containing pharmaceutical proteins with conventional food corn would contaminate
the food supply. This prospect is at best unappetizing and at worst a health hazard. To prevent such an event,
regulatory agencies require a series of cultivation techniques intended to decrease the risk of commingling
between the pharm and the farm. The experience with the ﬁrst generation plants does not instill conﬁdence
in the ability of governmental or private controls to keep the pharm plants oﬀ the food farm. If the plants
8Pharming the Field: A look at the beneﬁts and risks of Bioengineering Plants, Conference sponsored by the Pew Initiative
on Food and Biotechnology, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, July 2002.
9Pharming, supra note 8.
10NRC 2002, supra note 8, at 228.
11Id.
12Gregory Jaﬀe, Food Biotechnology: A Legal Perspective: Remarks on Regulating Genetically Modiﬁed Foods in the United
States, 10 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 8, 2004.
5are not properly regulated, escapes and mishaps may stir suﬃcient public resentment to doom or delay the
adoption of this promising technology.
This manuscript focuses on the regulation of pharm plants, with a particular emphasis on the lessons learned
from regulatory successes and failures with the ﬁrst generation transgenic plants.
Part I is a review of the current regulatory system for pharm plants. Governmental agencies manage the
risks associated with pharm plants by relying almost exclusively on physical containment. Presumably, if
pharm plants cannot escape conﬁnement, they will pose no risks to the food supply or the environment.
However, an analysis in Part II of experiences with the ﬁrst generation of transgenic plants demonstrates
the overwhelming diﬃculty of containment. Transgenes have moved from crop to crop, apparently at will,
and the true extent of the spread of transgenic material is still unfolding. Even the most stringent eﬀorts
to contain ﬁeld grown plants have come perilously close to failure. Part II concludes with an evaluation of
alternative containment options. A range of containment technologies are available, but increasing certainty
in containment comes at a cost. Information regarding environmental and health risks for each individual
type of pharm plant could form a rational basis for selecting an appropriate containment technology, and yet
the present regulatory system does not elicit such information. In Part III, I evaluate the possibility of using
a pre-commercialization review process to assess the risks posed by pharm plants to the environment and
the food supply. Although food toxicity can be evaluated quite well, the possibility of unforeseen adverse
events remain, particularly with respect to food allergies and environmental eﬀects. Part IV presents the
argument that post-commercialization monitoring systems are necessary in order to detect and respond to
unanticipated diﬃculties, and to validate and improve the pre-commercialization review process. Part V
presents a ﬁnal regulatory scheme and a preliminary evaluation of the statutory support for such a scheme.
6I. The “Coordinated Framework” and Regulation of Pharm Plants
In the ﬁrst part of this paper I review the regulatory oversight for pharm plants. With a few notable
exceptions, pharm plants are regulated under the same set of statutes and rules as other transgenic plants.
The basic regulatory structure was set down in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1986, the Oﬃce
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released a “Coordinated Framework” detailing the regulatory
responsibilities of FDA, EPA and USDA (particularly the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Agency,
APHIS).13 This framework has been reviewed extensively, and will be summarized only brieﬂy here.14
A. Food and Drug Administration
FDA asserts regulatory authority over foods containing transgenic plant material under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”). FDA authority derives primarily from two sections of the FFDCA, 21
U.S.C. §34215, pertaining to adulterated food, and 21 U.S.C. § 34816, pertaining to food additives.
Section 342 empowers FDA to initiate an enforcement action against foods containing an “added” substance
that is present at levels that “may be injurious to health”. The term “added” has been interpreted expansively
and now includes substances that are added only indirectly.17 For example, environmental contaminants,
13Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 FR 23302, OSTP, June 26, 1986.
14See Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Issues in the Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants and Animals,
April 2004. See also, NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 101-20.
1521 U.S.C. §342, FFDCA § 402.
1621 U.S.C. §348, FFDCA § 408.
1739 FR 42743. See also Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed. New
York, New York. Foundation Press, 1991, at 298-99.
7such as mercury, are “added” under section 342 even though no person intentionally added these substances
to food.18 With respect to transgenic plants, FDA stated, “If a food produced by new biotechnology contains
a higher level of a substance than it might ordinarily have, then the level ‘may be injurious to health’ and
the agency could regulate the product under section 402(a)(1) [21 U.S.C. §342(a)(1)].”19 Where a substance
“may be injurious to health” and is diﬃcult to remove through improved food production techniques, FDA
may establish a tolerance level, demarcating the maximum allowable amount of the substance in food.20
FDA expends considerable resources to research and establish tolerance levels, and FDA has the option
instead of setting action levels. Action levels are generally conservative safety levels that, if exceeded, trigger
the research eﬀort to establish a tolerance.21 Enforcement under section 342 is only against foods that have
already entered the marketplace. With respect to a transgenic plant, the oﬀending substance would have to
be detected in a food product before FDA could initiate an enforcement action.
Further, FDA has authority under the food additive provision, 21 U.S.C. §348. The term food additive is
deﬁned as “any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly
or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise aﬀecting the characteristics of any food”, with the
broad exception that any food that is generally recognized as safe (GRAS) is not a food additive.22 In a
“Statement of Policy” issued in 1992, FDA noted that many substances produced in transgenic plants are
likely to be generally comparable to a substance that is already present in foods.23 FDA presumes that such
substances are GRAS. However, FDA went on to state, “It is possible, however, that the intended expression
product in a food could be [one] that diﬀers signiﬁcantly...from substances found currently in food. Such
substances may not be GRAS and may require regulation as a food additive.”24 In September 2000, this
18See United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc. 622 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1980).
19Coordinated Framework, supra note 13, at 23312.
2021 C.F.R. §109.6.
21Hutt, supra note 17, at 299.
2221 U.S.C. §321(s). FFDCA § 201(s).
23Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 FR 22984 at 22990, FDA, May 25, 1992.
24Id.
8policy withstood a court challenge brought by a coalition of concerned groups and individuals.25
In contrast to the post-market regulatory power under section 342, the food additive provisions create a
system of pre-market review administered by FDA. A company that petitions for food additive status has
the burden of providing suﬃcient evidence to establish safe levels for the food additive.26 The expense of
establishing a tolerance under section 342 falls primarily on FDA, while the regulated party bears much of
the cost of obtaining a food additive petition. Food additive petitions are signiﬁcant procedures, estimated
to cost roughly $15 to $25 million, over a span of years.27
For the most part, FDA has reviewed food safety issues for transgenic plants under a voluntary consultation
process.28 In commercializing the Flavr Savr tomato, the manufacturer and FDA conducted an extensive
consultation to resolve safety issues. The consultation culminated in an approved food additive petition for
an antibiotic resistance transgene that was present in the tomato.29 A Food Advisory Committee, consisting
of outside experts, recommended that FDA adopt a streamlined process for approving future transgenic
plants. In response FDA established an informal and voluntary process by which ﬁrms can submit safety
data.30 As of 2001, FDA had completed 45 consultations and expressed the belief that all developers of
transgenic foods marketed in the U.S. had consulted FDA.31 In 2001, FDA proposed to replace the volun-
tary consultation process with a mandatory submission process that would require developers of transgenic
crops to submit to FDA a notice of intent and food safety data at least 120 days prior to commercialization.32
25Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d (D.D.C. 2000).
26Pew Initiative, supra note 14, at 73.
27Id.
28Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 FR 4706 at 478, FDA, Jan. 18, 2001.
29Safety Assurance of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology in the United States, Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition, FDA, July 1996.
30Premarket Notice, supra note 28.
31Id at 478.
32Id.
9FDA has not codiﬁed this proposal into a regulation.
For pharm plants that are not intended for use in food, FDA post-market authority under section 342 re-
mains essentially unchanged. If a pharm plant or a transgene encoding a non-food product accidentally
enters the food supply, FDA would have the authority to evaluate the situation and, as appropriate, initiate
an enforcement action against the allegedly adulterated food. FDA exercised this power to recall food con-
taminated with the StarLink transgenic corn. StarLink corn contained a pesticidal protein not approved at
any concentration for human consumption.33
FDA remains committed to enforcing post-commercialization food safety standards under section 342. In
2002, FDA, EPA and USDA released guidelines for plants bioengineered to produce drugs and biologics.34
The guidelines contain almost no reference to food safety except to say, “When the bioengineered pharma-
ceutical plant is from a species that is used for food or feed, measures should be in place to ensure that
there is no inadvertent mixing of the bioengineered plant material with plant material intended for food or
feed use. The presence of any such material in food or feed could render such products adulterated under
the FD&C Act.”35 Thus, FDA’s most recent statement on the subject emphasizes post-commercialization
enforcement.
The food additive statutes provide a less certain grant of power to FDA over plants not intended for food.
The deﬁnition of a food additive sets out two primary types of additives that will be subject to regula-
tion.36 “Intentional” additives are those that are intentionally placed in food. “Incidental” additives are
those that are reasonably expected to aﬀect food, and legislative records show that the “incidental” cate-
gory was created with packaging materials and manufacturing processes in mind.37 In Natick Paperboard,
33See StarLink discussion, infra.
34Draft Guidance for Industry, Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices Derived from Bioengineered Plants for Use in Humans
and Animals, September 2002. Accessed at www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/bioplant.htm.
35Id.
36Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103, 1107 (1st Cir. 1975)
37Id. citing H. Rep. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5 (1958).
10the court considered whether paper packaging material containing high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls
would be considered a food additive and could be subject to FDA enforcement even prior to its use as a food
packaging. The court determined that the paperboard was a food additive, as long as there was reasonable
expectation that it would be used for food packaging.38 Paperboard to be used for other purposes would
not come under FDA jurisdiction.39 The court seems to suggest that factors to be weighed in determining
the “reasonably expected” portion of the test might include the intent of the manufacturer as well as the
actual likelihood of the event.40 The analogy to pharm plants is not perfect, but it is likely that if there is no
reasonable expectation that a pharm plant will become part of food, then the food additive provisions would
be inapplicable. The degree to which pharm plants can be segregated from food plants would surely be a
signiﬁcant factor in determining the applicability of the food additive provisions. If pharm plants can be
perfectly contained, there would be no reasonable expectation that the plant or the transgene would come in
contact with food and no reason, or power, to regulate such plants as food additives. The notion that pharm
plants can be absolutely prevented from commingling with food products is consistent with present regula-
tory policy, and perhaps it is for this reason that FDA has never attempted to use food additive provisions
to regulate pharm plants. However, there are many reasons, presented below, to believe that containment is
actually far from perfect, and that there may in fact be a reasonable expectation that pharm plants would
mingle with food materials. If this were the case, FDA might be able to subject non-food pharm plants to
the pre-commercialization food additive review system.
Although the statutory authority for FDA’s pre-market review of pharm plants is unclear, FDA has sought to
provide some pre-market safety review through voluntary proceedings. FDA has announced that it “encour-
ages developers of bioengineered plants that are not intended for use in food or feed, but that theoretically
38Id. at 1107.
39Id.
40Id. at 1108.
11could enter the food or feed supply, to participate in [a] consultation program.”41 However, it is notable
that at least one pharm crop, corn engineered to express avidin, has been grown commercially without any
apparent consultation with FDA.42 At high levels avidin can cause a serious vitamin deﬁciency in humans.43
So, it is unlikely that the voluntary system actually provides a food safety review for all pharm plants. Critics
have suggested that the quality of data the FDA receives in these voluntary proceedings is inadequate to
make a proper risk assessment.44
The 2002 Draft Guidelines emphasize an important additional power that FDA can exercise over pharm
plants that produce pharmaceuticals: drug regulatory power under the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262 et seq.) and the FFDCA. Under these statutes, FDA has the power to approve or not approve the sale
of any drug and FDA can also exercise control over drug manufacturing processes. In fact, the bulk of the
Guidelines are devoted suggestions for sound “manufacturing” processes in plants, emphasizing reproducibil-
ity, suggesting that FDA does intend to assert control over the drug “manufacturing” that takes place in
plants.45
In sum, the regulatory scheme implemented by FDA includes voluntary pre-market food safety assessment
for pharm plants, mandatory pre-market drug safety review for drug products derived from pharm plants,
and the threat of enforcement proceedings in the event that non-food plant material or transgenes enter the
food supply.
Intriguingly, FDA authority to require pre-market regulation of pharm plants as food additives may depend
on the degree of containment that is reasonably expected. However, as a practical matter, FDA probably
41Premarket Notice, supra note 28, at 4714.
42NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 108-9.
43Id.
44Jaﬀe, supra note 12.
45Draft Guidelines, supra note 33.
12has suﬃcient power to force pharm plant developers into pre-market review system anyway.
B. United States Department of Agriculture
USDA has regulatory authority over ﬁeld releases of transgenic “plant pests” under the Federal Plant Pest
Act and the Plant Quarantine Act46 (later superceded by the Plant Protection Act47). The act is admin-
istered by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) within USDA. APHIS formulated
ﬁnal regulations under this statutory authority, presented in 7 CFR part 340.48 APHIS asserted authority
only over “regulated articles”, which are essentially organisms that are, or contain, “plant pests”.49 In
reviewing these regulations, the National Research Council wrote, “The deﬁnition of plant pest is in many
ways extremely broad but in other ways surprisingly restricted...[I]f a transgenic plant was created from
a nonweedy species without the insertion of genes from a plant pest and it was transformed without the
intervention of a plant pest, it would not necessarily be considered a regulated article.” NRC expresses the
concern that the presence of a “plant pest” in many transgenic plants is merely a matter of happenstance
resulting from the choice of technology during the engineering of the plant. The “plant pest” portions are
used merely as tools and, in many instances, could be replaced by non-plant pest tools, possibly eliminating
USDA’s regulatory hold over the plant. However, NRC notes that, “In such cases, the creators of transgenic
46Coordinated Framework, supra note 13, at 23342.
477 U.S.C. 7701 et seq. 7 U.S.C. § 7758 speciﬁcally repeals the previous statutes, although § 7758(c) preserves regulations
promulgated under the earlier laws until such time as new regulations were approved. No new regulations have been generated
and so the older laws are essentially still in eﬀect.
487 C.F.R. § 340.
49“Regulated article” is deﬁned as: “Any organism which has been altered or produced through genetic engineering, if the
donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to any genus or taxon designated in a list of taxa known
to have plant pests and meets the deﬁnition of a plant pest...”
Plant pests are deﬁned to include essentially any organism, including viruses, known to directly or indirectly damage plants
or products of plants. Most methods for generating a transgenic plant involve the use of a DNA fragment from a virus or
bacterium that is a plant pest. Even though this DNA fragment may be largely incidental to the trait being engineered, it
provides a regulatory hook that APHIS relies upon to assert jurisdiction.
13plants to be ﬁeld released apparently have always sent a ‘courtesy’ notiﬁcation or permit application to
APHIS.”50 Thus, despite a possible loophole in the deﬁnitions, it does not appear that industry participants
are attempting to escape regulation in this manner.
APHIS jurisdiction attaches when a party wishes to grow a transgenic plant in the ﬁeld as part of inter-
state commerce. APHIS can impose one of three levels of regulation: notiﬁcation, permit or deregulation.
Notiﬁcation is the most permissive regulatory scheme.51 The party need only notify APHIS of the planned
ﬁeld release and provide data suﬃcient to satisfy a set of six criteria.52 Plants containing a transgene that
encodes a product intended for pharmaceutical use are speciﬁcally excluded from the notice system and can
only be grown in the open ﬁeld under a more stringent regulatory procedure.53 An interim rule released
August 6, 2003, also excluded plants engineered to produce industrial compounds from the notice system.54
Industrial compounds are deﬁned as those that meet all three of the following criteria: (1) the compound
is new to the plant; (2) the new compound has not been used commonly in food or feed; and (3) the new
compound is being expressed for a non-food or non-feed industrial use.55
A pharm plant may only be grown in the ﬁeld under a permit procedure, described in 7 CFR 340.4.56 Under
this procedure, a party submits information describing the transgenic plant, the nature of the ﬁeld growth,
the intended use for the plant and containment measures to be used.57 According to the National Research
Council, which has reviewed APHIS procedures, the primary concern in the permit process is to ensure the
50NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 107.
517 C.F.R. 340.3.
52Id.
537 C.F.R. 340.3(b)(4)(iii).
54Introductions of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds, 68 FR 46434, APHIS, August 6, 2003.
55Id. at 46435.
567 CFR 340.4
57Id.
14appropriate containment of the plant to minimize the chance of any eﬀects outside the test site.58 A permit
may be issued with various constraints and requirements, particularly with respect to the duration, location
and containment of the transgenic plant.59 APHIS has the right to inspect for permit compliance.60
In 2003, responding to a variety of concerns, APHIS announced new permit conditions for ﬁeld testing of all
plants engineered to produce pharmaceutical and/or industrial compounds.61 These conditions include:
1.
A perimeter fallow zone of 50 feet;
2.
A possible requirement to allow the test ﬁeld to lie fallow in cases where a pharm
plant could grow up in the season following the test (a “volunteer” plant);
3. Dedicated planter and harvester machinery for use with the engineered plants only; and
4.
Dedicated facilities for storage of equipment and plant material during the ﬁeld test
is required, along with speciﬁc cleaning and drying techniques for the harvested crops.62
With respect to corn speciﬁcally, APHIS suggests two control mechanisms, (1) a distance of at least one mile
between pharm corn and any other corn, or (2) manual bagging over corn tassels to reduce pollen drift, with
58NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 109.
59Id.
607 CFR 340.4(d).
61Field Testing of Plants Engineered to Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 FR 11337 at 11338, APHIS,
March 10, 2003.
15a 28 day oﬀset from the planting schedule of any corn growing at a distance of one-half mile to a mile.63 The
28 day oﬀset for the planting schedule is intended to ensure that, when the pharm corn is releasing pollen,
traditional corn in the area is not at a stage where it is receptive to pollen. In addition, APHIS announced
its intention to increase the number of site inspections to enforce compliance with the permit conditions.64
The third tier of the APHIS system is the petition for determination of nonregulated status, under 7 C.F.R.
340.6.65 A transgenic plant that has achieved nonregulated status can be grown without any further USDA
oversight. All of the widely grown soybean, corn, cotton and canola varieties have been granted non-regulated
status.66 APHIS has indicated that nonregulated status is not available to pharm plants.
C. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA authority over transgenic plants is not expected to extend signiﬁcantly to pharm plants. However,
EPA oversight played a prominent role in the StarLink incident, discussed below, and so a brief overview
is provided. EPA regulates transgenic plants that are engineered to produce a pesticidal product under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).67 These pesticidal products are often
referred to as Plant Incorporated Protectants, or “PIPs”. EPA is responsible for establishing the safety of
PIPs both with respect to human health68 and the environment69. EPA oversight under FIFRA dovetails
with FDA enforcement of adulterated foods. If a pesticide in a food exceeds the tolerance set by EPA,
the food is adulterated for the purpose of FDA and enforcement action may be taken.70 Many plants are
63Id. at 11388.
64Id at 11388-89.
657 C.F.R. 340.6.
66NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 111.
677 U.S.C. § 135 et seq.
6821 U.S.C. § 346a.
697 U.S.C. § 136a.
7021 U.S.C. §§ 342 and 346a.
16engineered to express pesticidal proteins. For example, the bacterium Bacillus thuringensis produces several
toxins (“Bt toxins”) that are lethal to moths and butterﬂies, many of which are pests.71 Plants have been
engineered to express Bt toxins to assist with pest control.72 The pesticidal transgene is regulated by EPA
and evaluated for safety in the environment and the food supply.
EPA also has authority over chemical substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).73 74
Drugs and food are excluded from the substances that are regulated under TSCA.75 Plants engineered to
produce industrial products presumably could be regulated under TSCA.76
D. Summary of Regulations for Pharm Plants
In summary, APHIS and FDA have the primary regulatory authority relating to pharm plants.
APHIS administers the permits that are required for open ﬁeld growth of pharm plants. In setting con-
ditions for permits, APHIS is primarily interested in containment measures that are intended to prevent
mixing between pharm crops and food crops.
FDA operates a voluntary system by which a developer of a pharm plant for a non-food purpose may seek
71National Research Council, Genetically Modiﬁed Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation, National Academy Press
(Washington D.C. 2000), at 27.
72Id.
7315 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
74Coordinated Framework, supra note 13, at 23315. See also Pew Initiative, supra note 14.
7515 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A).
76Pew Initiative, supra note 14, at 48.
17FDA input on food safety issues. FDA also expresses willingness to take post-commercialization enforcement
action against food that is adulterated by non-food pharm plants. Furthermore, FDA will review all drugs
obtained from pharm plants for safety and eﬃcacy.
Under this regulatory system, the only guaranteed pre-market oversight of pharm plants is on the issue of
containment. No risk assessment of health or environmental risks will be made consistently. Two critical
question arise from this evaluation of the present regulatory scheme for pharm plants. First, do the contain-
ment measures work? And second, if containment measures do not work, is post-market enforcement action
likely to control any risks to the food supply? An analysis of actual ﬁeld experience with transgenic plants
suggests that the answer to both of these questions is no.
II. Containment and Unpredictability: Lessons from the Field
The eﬀectiveness of containment measures in preventing the escape of trangenic plants has been diﬃcult to
address through theoretical models and small experimental ﬁeld sites.77 As will be seen from the materials
below, the variability of ﬁeld conditions often defy prediction. Fortunately, at present the ﬁrst generation of
transgenic plants have been widely cultivated for nearly a decade, and there has been some ﬁeld containment
experience with pharm plants as well. Additionally, scientists have generated considerable data on the ﬁeld
behavior of transgenic plants and their conventional brethren. A review of these studies provides considerable
insight into the eﬀectiveness of containment measures used for transgenic plants.
77Mary Rieger, Michael Lamond, et al. Pollen-mediated movement of herbicide resistance between commercial canola ﬁelds.
Science June 28, 2002 at 2386.
18A. ProdiGene, Inc.: Wandering Oﬀ the Pharm
The most direct indication that the containment measures used with pharm plants may not be eﬀective comes
from the near escape of corn plants that were engineered for expression of a protein for a swine vaccine.
The corn was engineered by ProdiGene, Inc., an agricultural biotechnology company that has pioneered the
business of pharming.78 Prodigene received approval for several small open ﬁeld plots of corn engineered to
express pharmaceutical or veterinary products. On November 13, 2002, USDA announced that it had dis-
covered permit violations at two pharm corn sites under cultivation by ProdiGene. The plants were designed
to provide an oral vaccine to swine for the prevention of Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus (TGEV).79
At a site in Nebraska, pharm corn had been planted in 2001, and non-pharm soybean had been planted in
the following year.80 An inspection revealed that corn was growing in the soybean ﬁeld, presumably from
seed set down in the previous growing season. This situation, where corn grows up from seed from the
previous season, is familiar and the plants are referred to as “volunteer” corn. The presence of volunteer
corn, presumably pharm corn, was a violation of the APHIS permit. ProdiGene was instructed to destroy
the soybeans. However, the soybeans were harvested and moved to a storage facility where they were mixed
with 500,000 bushels of soybeans.81 Under a consent agreement, ProdiGene agreed to reimburse USDA for
the cost of destroying the soybeans.82 The destroyed soybeans were valued at approximately $3.5 million.83
78www.prodigene.com.
79.See U.S. Patent Nos. 6,034,298 and 5,914,123 See also Greg Burns and Julie Deardorﬀ, Modiﬁed Crops Raise Fears of
Contamination, Chicago Tribune, November 18, 2002.
80USDA INVESTIGATES BIOTECH COMPANY FOR POSSIBLE PERMIT VIOLATIONS, APHIS News, Nov. 13, 2002.
Accessed at www.biotech.wisc.edu/Education/prodigene.html.
81Id.
82USDA Announces Actions Regarding Plant Protection Act Violations Involving ProdiGene, Inc., USDA Press Release
No. 4098.02, December 6, 2002. Accessed at www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/12/0498.htm.
83Norman Ellstrand, Going to “Great Lengths” to Prevent the Escape of Genes that Produce Specialty Chemicals, Plant
Physiology, August 2003 at 1770.
19Inspectors also discovered volunteer corn at another ProdiGene pharm corn site in Iowa. This also was a
violation of permit conditions, and 155 acres of surrounding corn were destroyed.84 ProdiGene also agreed
to pay a civil ﬁne of $250,000 in settlement of the two incidents.85
The ProdiGene incidents illustrate weaknesses in the containment systems employed by APHIS. First, the
mechanisms that were relied upon in the ProdiGene incident required compliance on the part of the regulated
parties.86 ProdiGene committed at least three permit violations in these incidents, allowing the growth of
tassled (i.e., pollen bearing) pharm corn in a season after the permits had expired.87
The ProdiGene incidents took place under fairly tight permit regulations designed for pharm corn, and
thus are most directly predictive of the success of future pharm plant containment measures. It is notable
that the pharm plant permit conditions recently proposed by APHIS rely almost entirely on containment
measures that require compliance by regulated parties.88 The failure of the regulated parties to conform
to the stringent permit conditions casts serious doubt on the eﬀectiveness of any containment measure that
relies upon human behavior.
B. StarLink Corn: The Early Warning Signs
First generation transgenic plants have been subject to relatively relaxed containment requirements, relative
to pharm plants. Nonetheless, the extensive experience with ﬁrst generation transgenic plants provides
insight into foreseeable diﬃculties in preventing the spread of pharm transgenes.
84APHIS News, supra note 80.
85USDA Press Release, supra note 82.
86Id.
87Id.
88Field Testing, supra note 61, at 11338.
20In 1998, AgrEvo USA Co. obtained the ﬁnal regulatory approvals for commercialization of the now infamous
StarLink corn.89 StarLink corn is engineered to express a toxin of Bacillus thuringensis (a “Bt” toxin), called
Cry9C. This toxin selectively kills Lepidopteran insects (primarily moths and butterﬂies). 90 Bt corn varieties
were designed to provide resistance to the caterpillar phase of the European corn borer moth.91 Bt toxins
are biodegradable and highly selective, and farmers have used B. thuringensis bacteria for decades as a
biological pesticidal agent applied directly to crops.92 Partly because Bt toxin residues from these biological
pesticide applications were already known to be safe in foods, EPA had permitted commercialization of other
transgenic crops engineered to express Bt toxins.93
Cry9C is diﬀerent from previously approved Bt toxins, and EPA refused to register StarLink for use in
human food products.94 EPA was concerned that Cry9C exhibited properties that are correlated with prop-
erties of allergenic proteins, and a Scientiﬁc Advisory Panel could not conclude that Cry9C was not a food
allergen.95 AgrEvo requested registration only for use in animal feed. In 1998, EPA approved the so-called
“split registration”, allowing the commercialization of StarLink corn exclusively for use in animal feed.96
Pursuant to the animal feed restriction, APHIS awarded StarLink deregulated status.97
EPA discussed various routes by which humans might be exposed to Cry9C, including exposure to skin,
inhalation and exposure in drinking water. 98 This discussion is notable in view of later events. Each of the
89For a detailed account of the StarLink incident, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from
the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 593, Spring 2003.
90National Research Council, Genetically Modiﬁed Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation, National Academy Press
(Washington, D.C., 2000).
91Id.
92Plant Pesticide Bacillus thuringiensis CryIA(b) Delta-Endotoxin and the Genetic Material Necessary for its Production
(Plasmid Vector pCIB4431) in Corn, 60 FR 42443 at 42444, EPA, Aug. 16, 1995.
93Id.
94Bratspies, supra note 89, at 594.
95Food Allergenicity of Cry9C Endotoxin and Other Non-digestible Proteins, SAP Report No. 2000-01A, June 29, 2000.
96Plant Pesticide Bacillus thuringiensis CryIA(b) Delta-Endotoxin and the Genetic Material Necessary for its Production
in Corn; Exemption from the Requirement for a Tolerance, 63 FR 28258, EPA, May 22, 1998.
9763 FR 27041.
98Bt Exemption, supra note 96, at 28259.
21exposure were deemed unlikely. On the subject of oral exposure, EPA reported, “Minimal to non-existent
oral exposure could occur from ingestion of meat, poultry, eggs or milk from animals fed corn containing the
plant-pesticide...This is viewed as a remote possibility due to...the anticipated degradation and elimination
of the Cry9C protein by the animal.”99 Thus the only oral exposure route considered was the indirect ex-
posure resulting from consuming food from animals that were fed StarLink corn. Among all of the exposure
risks contemplated by the EPA, direct entry of StarLink corn into the human food supply was not even
mentioned as a possibility.
In September, 2000, after StarLink had been grown commercially for three seasons, a non-proﬁt organization,
Genetically Engineered Food Alert, reported to the Washington Post that Cry9C DNA had been detected
in taco shells.100 These results were veriﬁed by FDA and USDA. The Grain Inspection Service conducted
roughly 110,000 grain tests for the presence of Cry9C across the U.S. in late 2000 and early 2001.101 Of
these tests, about one-tenth were positive, indicating a rapid and extensive spread of the transgene through
the agricultural system.102
Because the Cry9C protein had not received a tolerance or exemption for human food, the contaminated
food was automatically adulterated and illegal, triggering a recall by food manufacturers in the United States
and abroad.103 Millions of dollars worth of ﬁnished food product were destroyed.104 Aventis CropScience
(AgrEvo’s corporate successor to StarLink) and USDA initiated a buyback program to purchase contam-
inated corn and redirect the corn to the animal feed market.105 Decreases in the export of U.S. corn to
Japan, South Korea and Europe are all attributed to the StarLink incident.106 A lawsuit by consumers
99Id.
100Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells, Washington Post, September 18, 2000.
101Alexander Haslberger, Letter to the Editor, Nature Biotechnology, July 2001. See also Anthony Shadid, Genetically
Engineered Corn Appears in One-Tenth of Grain Tests, Boston Globe, May 3, 2001.
102Id.
103Pew Initiative, supra note 14, at 85.
104K.T. Arasu , Aventis says has paId millions over gene-altered corn, Reuters, January 5, 2001.
105Scott Killman , Aventis Is Suspending Seed Sales Of Genetically Engineered Corn, Wall Street Journal, September 27,
2000.
106William Lin, Gregory K. Price, and Edward Allen, Impacts on the U.S. Corn Market and World Trade, USDA’s Feed
22against manufacturers of the contaminated food settled for $9 million, and lawsuits by farmers against
Aventis CropScience have settled for a reported $110 million.107 108
The StarLink incident stands as a lasting example of failed control systems and illustrates the diﬃculty that
a regulatory agency faces in predicting the risks associated with a transgenic crop. Aventis CropScience
has been pinned with much responsibility for the incident. As alleged by plaintiﬀ farmers in a class action
lawsuit, Aventis CropScience failed to notify farmers of the restrictions set in place by EPA to prevent
commingling with the food supply.109 These restrictions included requirements for a 660 foot buﬀer zone be-
tween StarLink and non-StarLink crops and appropriate post-harvest handling and marketing procedures.110
Allegedly, Aventis CropScience actively informed farmers that StarLink was ﬁt for human consumption and
need not be segregated from other crops.111
It is startling how wildly EPA misjudged the likelihood that StarLink corn would enter the human food sup-
ply. By denying a tolerance for StarLink corn in human food, EPA created a black-and-white legal situation.
Food contaminated with even trace amounts of Cry9C would immediately become legally adulterated and
subject to recall or destruction. In the end, there are no veriﬁed adverse health consequences attributed to
Cry9C112, and all of the economic damaged suﬀered could be attributed to a mixture of under-regulation
(lack of containment) and over-regulation (no tolerance level set for Cry9C in food). If one assumes that
EPA felt conﬁdent that the guidelines promulgated for containment of StarLink were suﬃcient to prevent
the escape into food products and to avoid the type of economic disaster that in fact occurred, then EPA’s
predictions of risk were quite inaccurate.
Yearbook, 2001, pp. 40-48.
107Mike Robinson, Judge approves $9 million settlement in bioengineered-corn suit, Associated Press, March 8, 2002.
108K.T. Arasu, US farmers reach $110 million StarLink settlement, Reuters, Feb 10, 2003.
109In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F.Supp.2d. 828, at 834-35 (D. N.Ill. 2002).
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112Investigation of Human Health Eﬀects Associated with Potential Exposure to Genetically Modiﬁed Corn, A Report to the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, June 2001.
23Compliance failures by Aventis CropScience may have been a major contributing factor to the contamination
of the food supply. However, a review of scientiﬁc research on the commingling of transgenic and conventional
crops, presented below, reveals that, in corn and many other plant species, transgenes move from plant to
plant frequently, seemingly without regard for human eﬀorts at conﬁnement. In hindsight, EPA’s reliance
on a 660-foot buﬀer zone to protect the food supply was painfully na¨ ıve.
C. The Seed Supply
The path of a grain crop from seed to cereal bowl was, even in the pre-StarLink days, subject to considerable
control eﬀorts. Evidence now shows that the commingling of transgenic and conventional crops has occurred
at nearly every step of the process. The path begins with the growth of seed crop, meaning crop that will
be sold as seed to farmers. In April 2004 the Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”), a non-proﬁt group
that has advocated for tighter regulation of transgenic plants, released a pilot study indicating that there is
widespread commingling of transgenic construct with organic, non-transgenic seed lots.113
Plant breeders take signiﬁcant eﬀorts to preserve the purity of seed stocks. Therefore, the UCS ﬁnding sends
a particularly strong message about the ease with which transgenes evade the standard containment and
segregation eﬀorts. The Association of Oﬃcial Seed Certiﬁcation Agencies maintains a set of standards for
seed growers.114 These standards involve detailed instructions on the practices that are necessary to maintain
suﬃcient purity in seed stocks, including prescribed growing practices, isolation from other varieties, tolerance
levels for oﬀ-variety plants, etc. 115 Seed purity is maintained in part through a system of several diﬀerent
types of stock of decreasing purity. 116 “Breeder” seeds are the highest purity, directly controlled by the
113Margaret Mellon and Jane Rissler, Gone to Seed: Transgenic Contaminants in the Traditional Seed Supply, Union of
Concerned Scientists, 2004.
114Operational Procedures, Crop Standards and Service Programs Publications, Association of Oﬃcial Seed Certifying Agen-
cies, 2003. Accessed at www.aosca.org.
115Id. at 149-57.
116Id. at 140.
24institution that originally created the variety, or by a designate selected by the originating institution.117
“Foundation” seed are progeny of the breeder seed that are produced under the same conditions as the breeder
seed. From each batch of foundation seed, plants that are identiﬁed as particularly desirable exemplars for
maintenance of the variety are used to replenish the breeder seed.118 The next tier of seed is “Registered”
seed, which is progeny of the Breeder or Foundation seed, but grown only in accordance with accepted
procedures, not necessarily under control of the originating institution. 119 “Certiﬁed” seed is progeny of
Breeder, Foundation or Registered seed that meets the quality standards of the certifying agency.120 The
bulk of commercial seed sold to farmers in a growing season is the progeny of registered seed. Farmers
may also hold back a portion of the previous year’s harvest to use for seed.121 For each category of seed, a
tolerance for oﬀ-variety seed is set. For example, in canola (rapeseed), foundation seed is permitted to have
no more than 0.05% oﬀ-types, and the tolerance for certiﬁed seed is set at 0.25%.122
UCS found that only one of six corn and soybean seed lots tested was free of DNA derived from a transgenic
source.123 Six of six canola seed lots contained DNA derived from a transgenic source.124 Transgenic DNA
was reported at levels of 0.1% to 1% in the tested seed lots.125 The presence of commingling in soybeans was
particularly surprising, as soybeans are predominantly self-pollinating, meaning that soybean commingling is
more likely to occur as a result of mixing during human handling, as opposed to cross-hybridization mediated
by pollen drifting from neighboring transgenic crop plantations.126
The UCS report is not the ﬁrst documentation of transgenes commingling with conventional seed lots. In
117Id.
118Id.
119Id.
120Id. at 141.
121A helpful summary of the seed system is provided in Mellon, supra note 113. Note that in the case of hybrid plants, ﬁeld
grown seed does not usually breed true, and farmers will rarely use this seed.
122AOSCA, supra note 114, at 153.
123Mellon, supra note 113, at 25.
124Id.
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252001, USDA reported that 300,000 to 400,000 bags of seed corn had tested positive for the StarLink Cry9C
gene. 127 USDA budgeted $15-20 million to buy back as much of the adulterated seed corn as possible.128
Certiﬁed, pedigreed conventional canola seed lots in western Canada were independently conﬁrmed to contain
genetically engineered herbicide resistance traits.129
Based on these reports, we can conclude that canola, corn and soybean farmers will begin each growing
season with seeds that contain approximately a 0.1-1% unexpected transgenic content. Furthermore, we
can conclude that while containment measures set by AOSCA may be suﬃcient to maintain separate plant
varieties, these containment measures are not suﬃcient to eliminate crop-to-crop gene ﬂow. Yet this is only
the beginning of the agricultural cycle. During the next phase of crop growth, open ﬁeld cultivation by
farmers, the opportunities for mixing of transgenic varieties with each other and with conventional varieties
abound.
D. In the Open Field: Pollen Drift and Volunteers
The scientiﬁc community has taken considerable eﬀorts to evaluate pollen drift as a mechanism for transgene
movement. Pollen is the male gamete produced by most plants.130 Pollen may travel to another plant and
fertilize the female gamete to produce a “cross-pollinated” oﬀspring containing genetic material from both
parents.131 Pollen may also fertilize female gametes of the same plant, producing “self-pollinated” oﬀspring
containing the genetic material of the single parent.132 Some plants predominantly self-pollinate, to the near
127Marc Kaufmann, Going Backwards: U.S. Will Buy Back Corn Seed: Firms to Be Compensated for Batches Mixed With
Biotech Variety, Washington Post, March 8, 2001
128Id.
129Van Acker, R.C., Brule-Babel, A.L., Friesen, L.F. An Environmental Safety Assessment of Roundup Ready r  Wheat: Risks
for Direct Seeding Systems in Western Canada, Report prepared for The Canadian Wheat Board, For submission to: Plant
Biosafety Oﬃce of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, June 2003.
130NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 67.
131Id.
132Id. at 68.
26exclusion of cross-pollination, while other plants are frequent cross-pollinators.133 Pollen may be spread by
a number of mechanisms, including wind and pollinating insects.134 Cross-pollination is thought to be a
very signiﬁcant issue in canola and corn. AOSCA recommends a separation of 660 feet between seed corn
plots and neighboring plots.135 The recommended separation for canola ranges from 660 to 1320 feet.136
In Australia, scientists conducted an analysis of pollen drift from transgenic to conventional canola in the
year 2000, the ﬁrst year of commercial cultivation of transgenic canola on that continent.137 The study
encompassed a geographical area equal to roughly one-third of the continent, and involved measurements of
over 48 million plants in actual commercial canola plantings.138 The results showed that cross-pollination
of conventional canola by transgenic canola occurred rarely, generally at rates of 0.1 – 0.2% or less, but
contamination occurred over distances of 3 kilometers, far greater than the AOSCA recommendations for
preserving canola seed purity.139
The experience of Canadian farmers with canola crops conﬁrms the ease with which transgenic canola can
mingle with conventional crops and even other transgenic canola varieties. In 1995, the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency approved the unconﬁned commercial cultivation of Roundup Ready canola.140 In part,
CFIA anticipated that gene ﬂow among canola crops would be contained by various provisions, including
boundary regions between conventional and transgenic crops.141 In the event, Roundup Ready canola spread
rapidly throughout the canola crops in western Canada. Several investigators have reported that even
133Id.
134Katie Eastham and Jeremy Sweet, Genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs): The signiﬁcance of gene ﬂow through pollen
transfer, Environmental Issue Report 28, European Environmental Agency, Copenhagen, Denmark 2002.
135AOSCA, supra note, at 151.
136Id. at 153.
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138Id.
139Id. at 2387.
140Decision Document DD95-02: Determination of Environmental Safety of Monsanto Canada Inc.’s Roundup
Herbicide-Tolerant Brassica napus Canola Line GT73, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 1995. Available at
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/plaveg/pbo/dd.
141Id.
27pedigreed conventional seed lots are contaminated with transgenic canola.142 The adventitious transgenic
canola is expected to cause contamination of most conventional canola crops at a rate of less than 1%. At
this rate, and given that canola is primarily used to generate oil, which would retain no trace of the original
plant genetic material, there is no realistic health concern.143 However, this presents yet another instance
where a regulatory agency underestimated the ability of transgenic crop to escape containment measures.
Crop-to-crop gene ﬂow in canola has also reportedly given rise to canola plants in Canada having resistance
to three diﬀerent herbicides, Roundup, Liberty and Pursuit.144 Two of these resistance traits are transgenes,
while one is the result of more traditional approaches to crop breeding.145
Corn is also well-known to cross-pollinate. Eastham and Sweet have reviewed dozens of experiments de-
signed to measure the distance over which corn can hybridize.146 The results show that in varying studies,
measurable pollination occurred at distances ranging from around 20 meters to 800 meters, and the authors
conclude that small quantities of pollen are likely to travel much farther.147
Apart from the risk of crop-to-crop commingling, pollen drift represents a signiﬁcant concern for the move-
ment of transgenes into wild populations. Unlike most crops, canola has closely related wild plant varieties.
Thus, transgenic canola presents risks for transgene movement both within the food supply and movement
between the food supply and the environment.
Scientists in Great Britain have conducted extensive studies on pollen drift between wild and cultivated canola
142Van Acker, supra note 127, at 6-7.
143Id.
144Mary MacArthur, Triple-resistant canola weeds found in Alta, Western Producer, Saskatchewan, Canada, February 10,
2000.
145Norman Ellstrand, When Transgenes Wander, Should We Worry?, Plant Physiology, April 2001, 1543-45.
146Eastham, supra note 134, at 38.
147Id. at 41.
28varieties. In Great Britain, the agricultural canola plant, Brassica rapa is known to cross-pollinate with the
wild species Brassica napus. Researches measured actual cross-pollination rates between agricultural and
wild species at several areas where the two plants grow in close proximity and over a period of several years.
Then, using large scale satellite images, the researches extrapolated to calculate an estimated nationwide
rate of cross-hybridization into the wild species. The result suggested an annual cross-hybridization rate of
about 40,000 per year.148
Sunﬂowers represent another example of a crop that undergoes extensive pollen-mediated gene ﬂow. There
are several wild varieties of sunﬂower that grow in the same areas as the cultivated plant. Studies in Canada
and North Dakota show that cross-hybridization is extensive.149 The authors concluded, “[T]ransgenes in
cultivated sunﬂowers should readily introgress into sympatric wild populations.”150
Several plants have been identiﬁed as relatively low risks for pollen-mediated transgene spread. These include
potato, soybean and rice. However, the lack of predictability associated with even these plants is surprising.
As noted above, the Union of Concerned Scientists observed transgene contamination in soybean seed lots.
In the case of potatoes, many ﬁeld studies have shown a maximum pollen drift distance of twenty meters, but
a single study showed 31% cross-pollination at a distance of 1000 meters!151 The remarkably diﬀerent result
was attributed to high levels of a pollen carrying insect, the pollen beetle.152 This illustrates the diﬃculty
of accounting for all factors in a ﬁeld grown crop; a normal natural occurrence, such as pollen beetles, may
cause considerable variation from conditions that were used in controlled tests.
148Wilkinson, M. J., Elliott, L.J., et al. HybrIdization Between Brassica napus and B. rapa on a National Scale in the United
Kingdom, Science, October 17, 2003, at 457.
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29In addition to pollen drift, contamination of open ﬁeld crops can occur because of volunteer plants. Anytime
a ﬁeld is planted in successive seasons, there is a risk that seed from a previous season will grow in the
next season. These plants are referred to as “volunteers”. If precisely the same variety of crop is planted
in successive years, the volunteer plants will not introduce any signiﬁcant impurity. However, crops are
often rotated, and when new varieties are planted, volunteers of a previous variety are likely to be mixed in
with the new variety. The risk of volunteer contamination is recognized by the AOSCA guidelines, which
specify a period of continuous years that a site should be used to establish a pure seed variety, thus diluting
volunteers over time.153 Likewise, the ProdiGene incidents illustrate the potential for volunteer pharm crops
to contaminate the food supply, or worse, cross-hybridize with neighboring plants.
E. The Human Factor
During cultivation and harvesting, transgenic plants come into contact with another important catalyst
for gene ﬂow: human beings. A review of notable transgene escapes reveals that people in positions of
responsibility for the stewardship of transgenic plants repeatedly fail to discharge their duties. APHIS
reports a non-compliance rate in the range of 2% for plants regulated under the ﬁeld test permit program.154
However, as the StarLink incident highlights, enforcement and detection of violations is far from perfect. In
the StarLink incident, Aventis CropScience was charged with providing farmers with information regarding
the proper management and use of StarLink corn. 155 Instead, the seed provider appears to have provided
almost no information to farmers, and may not even have informed them of the restriction to animal feed
only.156 Similarly, the ProdiGene incidents were marked by non-compliance.
153AOSCA, supra note 114, at 150.
154Biotechnology Regulatory Services, Compliance and Enforcement, USDA, APHIS. Accessed at
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30The matter of human behavior becomes more troubling on the international stage. To the extent that other
countries begin to grow pharm crops, it is unclear whether adequate regulatory measures will be set in
place, or enforced. Brazil does not permit the cultivation of transgenic crops except under a program of
temporary experimental permits termed “RETs”.157 However, many farmers are operating without RETs,
and in March 2003 the government announced that it would permit the sale of several tons of transgenic
soybeans that had been illegally grown in Brazil.158 Additionally, Mexico has barred transgenic corn for
years, and yet transgenes have entered the traditional corn varieties in remote areas of Mexico, hitherto
undetected.159 If pharm crops go international, it is not clear how containment will be achieved, or how
shipments of food grain contaminated with pharm grain would be detected. When the international angle is
factored in, even perfect containment of pharm crops in the U.S. may not be suﬃcient to achieve the desired
assurance that these plants are not entering the food supply.
F. Critique of Containment Measures
As these examples make plain, the containment measures used so far in the U.S. and Canada have not been
eﬀective at limiting the ﬂow of transgenes. The containment measures proposed for use with pharm crops are
quantitatively but not qualitatively diﬀerent. The permit conditions proposed by APHIS for pharm crops
will involve greater restrictions on distance between pharm crops and normal crops, and greater restrictions
on harvesting and storage methods.160 All of the containment mechanisms are heavily dependent on the
appropriate behavior of regulated parties.
157Mike Kepp , Brazilian Ministry to Crack Down On Experimental Transgenic Farms, International Environment News,
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31Several critiques may be leveled at these containment measures. First, each of these measures leaves open
the possibility of human error. It is not diﬃcult to imagine that bagging of corn tassels could be done
incompletely or not within the appropriate temporal oﬀset period. It also easy to imagine that harvesting
machinery could be slipped oﬀ the “pharm” and used in a diﬀerent ﬁeld. Increased enforcement, as proposed
by APHIS, would presumably help, but again it is a quantitative improvement. As demonstrated in the
ProdiGene and StarLink incidents, farmers and manufacturers do not always, and perhaps cannot always,
be expected to abide by the permit requirements.
A second critique has to do with the probabilistic nature of these constraints. The APHIS permit require-
ments for pharm corn note that the one mile perimeter requirement proposed for pharm corn is eight times
the 660 foot requirement set by AOSCA for maintaining seed purity.161 However, the AOSCA standard is
not designed to prevent all pollen drift, merely enough to retain the 0.1 to 0.5 percent purity standards.162
As noted by Eastham, weather conditions can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on pollen drift for some plants, as can
insects.163 None of the studies reviewed addressed the issue of extreme environmental conditions, such as
tornadoes, ﬂoods or unusual insect populations. Yet over a span of suﬃcient years, there is little doubt that
a pharm crop would encounter one or more of these situations. The proposed one mile separation of pharm
corn from other corn may decrease the probability of commingling, but it is easy to imagine fairly common
occurrences that could compromise the containment system.
Even at a low level escape rate, plants have the possibility of self-replication and propagation. This property
of living organisms raises the specter of irreversibility. It is not clear how easily even a small-scale escape
161Id.
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163Eastham, supra note 134, at 37.
32of a pharm plant could be controlled. After the StarLink release was reported, Aventis CropScience, USDA
and many other farmers and corporations initiated a program to eliminate StarLink from the human food
chain, with early estimates of control expenses nationwide put at over $1 billion.164 This has proven to
be quite diﬃcult. As of 2003, traces of the StarLink transgenes are still detected in batches of corn slated
for export. From October 2000 through March 2003, corn mills have tested over 200,000 lots of corn for
StarLink, initially showing a 1.2 percent positive test rate, trending downwards to about 0.1 percent by
2003.165 USDA tests continue to show batches positive for StarLink at somewhat higher rate, just under one
percent.166 As a single datapoint on the subject of reversibility, the StarLink experience urges great caution.
Were a harmful pharm crop to escape into the food supply, the eﬀects would be likely to linger for years.
One diﬃculty with physical containment is that once a plant has breached the containment, control can not
easily be reasserted. As the Union of Concerned Scientists noted, a farmer that believes himself to be dealing
with non-engineered crop varieties will not perform the containment techniques.167 Any escape from physical
containments has the possibility of spreading further and leading to increasing year-on-year contamination
of the food supply.
G. Alternative Containment Systems
A variety of biological containment systems have been proposed and tested. As opposed to the physical and
164Barboza, supra note 6.
165Chris Clayton, StarLink corn still shows up, Omaha World-Herald, July 30, 2003.
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33farmer-based containment systems discussed above, most biological containment systems have the appealing
feature of being self-perpetuating. For example, the progeny of a plant engineered to have reduced fertility
may retain that trait even after an initial escape event.
In one biocontainment approach, biologists have attempted to develop plants with limited abilities to outcross
with other plants. This type of technology has been reviewed by several authors recently.168 169 The
most widely discussed of these technologies is the so-called “terminator” technology. Essentially, a plant is
engineered such that the transgene encoding the pharmaceutical product is closely linked to a transgene that
causes sterility.170 These technologies are referred to as “Genetic Use Restriction Technology” or “GURT”
because they were originally used by companies such as Monsanto to prevent farmers from violating patent
rights by retaining engineered seed for reuse in subsequent seasons.171 Farmers objected to the use of these
technologies in food seeds because it prevented farmers from saving seed for use in the following year.172
In the context of plants designed to express pharmaceutical products, this level of control is desirable and
unlikely to provoke any outcry from farmers. However, the National Research Council has noted that the
GURT technology is new and not widely used in the ﬁeld, and accordingly, the degree of containment
achieved through GURT technology has not been established.173 A similar approach involves male sterility,
meaning that the plant is bred or engineered so that it will not produce pollen. This approach has been used
commercially in glufosinate-tolerant canola.174 However, the NRC writes, “Most types of male sterility are
leaky, so it will be important to test the reliability of this trait in a representative range of environmental
168Henry Daniell, Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops, Nature Biotechnology, June 2002, at
581.
169National Research Council, Biological Conﬁnement of Genetically Engineered Organisms Committee on the Biological Conﬁnement of Genetically Engineered Organisms,
National Academies Press (Washington, D.C. 2003), at 65-129.
170Daniell, supra note 168, at 583.
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34conditions.”175 Daniell also reports that male sterility techniques are seldom perfect.176
Traditional breeding techniques have been used to create sterile hybrid plants and plants that are sterile by
virtue of increased numbers of chromosomes (“sterile triploids”).177 Sterile hybrids need to be regenerated
year after year by mating the fertile parents. Sterile triploids self-fertilize allowing propagation, but also
meaning that volunteer plants would still be a risk.178 The NRC reports that some sterile hybrids are fully
sterile and could be used for eﬀective biocontainment, but that sterile hybrids have not been generated for
all plant types.179 Triploid plants show promise but have not been fully tested for conﬁnement possibility.180
A maternal inheritance technique for transgene containment has been developed by incorporating transgenes
into the chloroplast genome. A plant has several intracellular repositories for genetic material. The primary
plant genome resides in the nucleus and is distributed into both female and male gametes (i.e., ovule and
pollen).181 However, the choloroplasts contain their own repository of genetic material, and choloroplasts are
generally inherited only through the mother plant, meaning that transgenes contained in the chloroplast are
not usually transmitted through the pollen.182 The NRC refers to this approach as “potentially powerful”
but also states, “the leakiness of the system will need to be demonstrated empirically on a case-by-case
basis.”183
In summary, biological containment systems are mostly still in development, with few ﬁeld tested to a point
to have the full conﬁdence of the NRC. Nonetheless, some sterile hybrids with a near-zero escape risk may
175NRC 2003, supra note 169, at 78.
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35be available for use.
A simpler approach to preventing the ﬂow of pharmaceutical genes into food plants is to restrict the technol-
ogy to non-food plants. Plants such as tobacco, cotton and Arabidopsis thaliana are not used for food and
are readily amenable to genetic engineering.184 The level of certainty provided by this type of containment is
absolute. There is no reason to believe that transgenes from one of these plants will appear in food crops.185
Pharming companies have focused on food crops. Food crops are often more heavily studies and methods
for genetic manipulation have been developed. Apparently there is evidence that corn and other seed
crops are particularly desirable for producing certain pharmaceutically active proteins. ProdiGene uses
corn preferentially, having also tested tobacco, and notes that protein stability and shelf-life are improved
for proteins expressed in corn.186 Nonetheless, the non-food plant approach has been suggested by many
observers, and provides the only certain approach to conﬁnement.
This section illustrates that biological containment systems, while an appealing approach, are not yet per-
fected. Failsafe systems that are available, such as the use of sterile hybrids or non-food plants, limit the
choice of plant available to those developing pharm plants. Thus, failsafe biocontainment will place a heavy
burden on the technology, while partially eﬀective containment systems are more widely applicable and place
a somewhat lesser burden.
III. Assessing Risks
184Ellstrand 2003, supra note 83, at 1773.
185Id.
186http://www.prodigene.com/0202.htm
36Forcing agricultural biotechnology companies to adopt fail-safe biological containment approaches may se-
riously impair or delay the technology. It is a typical situation of costs and beneﬁts. Yet under the present
regulatory system, there is no mechanism for developing the information that would be needed to evaluate
the beneﬁts, the risks avoided through improved containment. The preceding discussion establishes that
physical and farmer-dependent containment methods are unlikely to prevent the eventual escape of pharm
plants into the food system or the environment, it does not address the matter of consequences. What harm
would result upon such an escape?
As explained by the National Research Council, risk analysis is a complex ﬁeld unto itself, but at a basic level
most risk analysis methods involve a mathematical combination of an identiﬁed hazard and the likelihood that
the hazard will occur (commonly referred to as the “exposure”).187 At a crude level, an agency conducting
risk analysis might provide a hazard score, measuring the degree of severity of the hazard, an exposure score,
reﬂecting the probability that a hazard will occur, and multiply these numbers to arrive at a risk factor.
The magnitude of this risk factor may then be used to guide regulatory decisions and the assess the degree
of regulatory eﬀort that is warranted.
In this section I evaluate the hazards posed by pharm plants under the assumption that they will escape
conﬁnement and enter the environment and the food supply. I also evaluate whether it is possible to assess
these hazards conﬁdently, or whether there is a signiﬁcant likelihood that predictive exercises are futile.
Presumably if pharm plants would pose no hazards upon escape, there would be no need for conﬁnement.
On the other hand, if a pharm plant poses a serious and highly predictable hazard, then extreme conﬁnement
or a complete ban might be the appropriate response. If science provides no predictive tools of any value,
187NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 54.
37than a pre-market assessment is futile and should be abandoned.
Experts have identiﬁed various hazards associated with transgenic plants, and these may be broken into three
broad categories: (1) threat to food safety resulting from commingling between non-food and food plans; (2)
threat of harm to natural ecosystems, primarily resulting from gene transfer from transgenic plants to wild
relatives; (3) threat of economic harm and harm to agricultural practices, primarily resulting from a lack of
acceptance of transgenic plant technology.188
In this section, I evaluate the degree to which the food and environmental safety risks posed by pharm plants
can be predicted at present and how these predictions might be used to guide management strategies for
pharm plants. I leave to the side the issue of consumer preference.
A. Food Safety
In considering the area of food safety, FDA has indicated the overall policy goal of safety and nutritional
assessment should be to “establish that the new food is as safe as foods in our grocery stores today.”189 A key
concept behind this statement is the notion that food does have risks, and there is no reason to expect that
crops should be safer than other foods. FDA has noted that products such as legumes and potatoes contain
toxicants that, if not removed through proper food preparation, can have human health consequences.190
The emphasis of this analysis is to establish whether FDA can, through pre-market review, evaluate whether
188Id. at 245-46.
189Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA’s Policy for Foods Developed by Biotechnology, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, 1995. Accessed at vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/biopolcy.html.
190Statement of Policy, supra note 23, at 22987.
38pharm plants that are not intended for food but nonetheless enter the food supply present risks in excess
of those presented by normal food crops. If FDA can provide an eﬀective risk proﬁle based on pre-market
review, then pre-market review should be adopted as a key tool in determining the appropriate containment
measures to be prescribed for each new pharm plant. A secondary consideration of this analysis is to
determine whether, as a group, pharm plants raise particular health concerns.
FDA has identiﬁed the primary risks associated with transgenic plants. These risks include alterations in
the nutritional content of the transgenic plants, outright toxicity of the proteins or other products produced
because of the transgene, and allergenicity of the proteins expressed from the transgene.191 For transgenic
plant engineered to produce non-food products, such as pharm plants, the focus is on toxicity and food
allergy.192
There is good reason to believe that plants producing pharmaceutical agents as a group pose an elevated
risk of having toxic or other undesirable eﬀects, although each plant is likely to have very diﬀerent properties
and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Pharmaceutical products are, by design, usually intended to
have eﬀects on human physiology at relatively low levels. In addition, pharming technology emphasizes the
yield of active pharmaceutical agent that can be obtained from a plant. An entire food batch manufactured
from a pharmaceutical crop may deliver a signiﬁcant dosage to a consumer. Depending on the potency of the
drug, even low level contamination, as would be expected from mingling caused by pollen drift, for example,
might deliver a dose that is suﬃcient to have undesirable eﬀects. Proteins produced for industrial purposes
may also have signiﬁcant eﬀects on human physiology193, although since this is not a primary purpose of an
191Id.
192Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology Derived Plants and To Establish Early Food
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39industrial protein, there will be considerable variation from protein to protein. One may safely say, however,
that proteins produced for pharmaceutical purposes will have eﬀects on human physiology.
The primary route of unintentional exposure to pharmaceutical crops is oral. It is diﬃcult to imagine that
such crops would be injected into people. Inhalation is reportedly a risk for agricultural workers, but not for
the general public.
By contrast, the expected route of administration for most protein drugs is not oral administration. Most
proteins are degraded in the gut by a combination of stomach acids and digestive enzymes. This degradation
is suﬃcient to render most protein therapeutics inactive. For this reason, most protein therapeutics produced
today are administered intravenously. However, many of the pharmaceutical plants in development are
designed explicitly for oral administration. ProdiGene has developed and patented a number of vaccination
methods that involve expressing the protein for use as a vaccine in a plant and then achieving vaccination
by administering plant material to a person or animal.194 The plants that nearly entered the food supply
in the ProdiGene incident were designed to provide an oral vaccine for swine.195 ProdiGene also plans to
develop corn-based human vaccines for hepatitis B.196
The use of food plants to produce orally active pharmaceutical agents should be viewed as a very serious
hazard indeed because the intended mode of pharmaceutical administration and the likely mode of unintended
consumption are identical. Vaccination programs using hepatitis B surface antigen are probably safe, but
continued concern about side eﬀects can be found in the literature.197 Side eﬀects do commonly result from
vaccines. The decision to vaccinate a population is based on a careful epidemiological assessment of the
deﬁciency. NRC 2002, supra note 7, at 180-181.
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40beneﬁts to derived from disease protection against the number of bad outcomes expected.198 A widespread
food contamination with an oral vaccine plant could upset this careful balancing.
On balance, there are reasons to believe that most pharm plants will have little toxic eﬀect on humans. Yet
at the same time, certain varieties may present special risks. The key question is whether FDA is likely to
be able to provide a strong predictive assessment of these risks.
FDA does have established methodologies for evaluating the toxicity of proposed food additives, and other
substances that may be present in foods. This includes the analysis of animal feeding experiments, and where
appropriate, human feeding experiments.199 FDA has elaborate guidelines for assessing toxic properties of
proposed food additives.200 In addition, FDA has set up speciﬁc guidelines for evaluating the safety of
proteins added to foods.201 In addition, FDA maintains a list of enzyme preparation used in foods, listing
over 30 types of enzymes.202 To the extent that the novel non-food products found in pharm plants are also
proteins, there is little reason to expect that the FDA’s safety assessment system for proteins would be any
less eﬀective with these plants.
Food allergies present the primary source of uncertainty in evaluating the safety of a pharm plant. In 1992,
FDA expressed concern about the transfer of proteins from a known allergenic material, such as peanuts,
ﬁsh, and eggs, to a previously non-allergenic crop. An individual who is allergic to peanuts might unwittingly
consume a diﬀerent food item engineered to express a peanut protein and suﬀer an allergic reaction.203 In
fact, a soybean engineered to express a protein from brazil nuts was found to cause allergies in individuals
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41with a Brazil nut sensitivity.204 This incident validates the concept that allergenicity may be transferred
from plant to plant by genetic techniques. However, it also illustrates the relative ease with which this type
of allergic risk can be evaluated by testing in the sensitive population.
A second allergic risk arises from the presence of a non-food protein found in food, as would be the case
for many pharm plants. Most allergies are caused by proteins, and thus the presence of a non-food protein
in food raises concern. Furthermore, because there has been no food allergy experience with a non-food
protein, there will not be a known sensitive population in which testing can be conducted. In 1992, FDA
stated, “At this time, FDA is unaware of any practical method to predict or assess the potential for new
proteins in food to induce allergenicity.”205 This conclusion was reiterated in 1995 after the conclusion of
a multi-agency conference on the subject.206 FDA did note that allergic reactions are caused by a small
subset of proteins, and that some assessment of the risk posed by a new protein could be obtained by a
careful comparison to known allergenic proteins.207 Another concern with allergies generally is that they
may occur extremely low protein levels and may occasionally have serious health consequences, such as
anaphylaxis.208 During the StarLink incident, the Scientiﬁc Advisory Panel commissioned by EPA to assess
the allergenicity of the Cry9C protein was unable to reach a scientiﬁcally sound conclusion on the issue.209
The well-respected scientiﬁc journal Nature Biotechnology commented on the StarLink incident, saying,
“The adventitious presence of Starlink in tacos had no consequences for human health, but could the same
be said of a crop variety designed for biopharmaceutical production?”210
To conclude, in the area of food safety, FDA has many systems in place that would allow a predictive risk
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42assessment. The problem of food allergies presents the primary source of uncertainty. While this risk might
be predictable where the transgene is derived from a substance that is a known allergen, there is little
predictive power for proteins from a non-food source.
B. Environmental Safety
Hazards to the environment are poorly understood. The National Academy of Sciences has reviewed the
issue of environmental threats posed by transgenic plants, and has stated, “[S]cientiﬁcally defensible ex ante
risk assessment is not yet possible, so it will not be possible to develop a science-based trigger based solely on
predictions of the risks associated with particular crop varieties.” 211 The most commonly cited hazard is the
development of “superweeds”, wild weeds that hybridize with transgenic crop plants and acquire transgenes
that make the weeds more diﬃcult to control.212 One can imagine that a weed acquiring resistance to the
herbicide glyphosate would become something of a “superweed” for farmers seeking to use glyphosate as a
herbicide. Any transgene designed to improve an agronomic property of a crop plant has some probability
of conferring an advantage on weeds. Resistance to the European corn borer, salinity tolerance, drought
resistance, all could be taken up by weeds and make the weeds more diﬃcult to control. As noted above, there
are serious weeds that cross-hybridize with agricultural varieties. Most notably, Johnson grass is considered
by some to be “the world’s worst weed”, and gene ﬂow from sorghum to Johnson grass has been observed.213
There has been a reported rise in the incidence of glyphosate resistant weeds.214 Glyphosate resistant weeds
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43have not yet been shown to be caused by movement of a transgene from the crop to the weed. Herbicide
resistance can also occur simply from the very high selective pressure that results when farmers rely heavily
on a single herbicide. In other words, a weed that naturally develops a mutation that confers glyphosate
resistance will likely compete very eﬀectively against non-resistant weeds in a ﬁeld where glyphosate is
routinely applied, and no ﬂow of transgenes into weeds need be posited for this eﬀect to occur.215
Environmentalists have also expressed concerns about the eﬀects that transgenes may have on the environ-
ment even without moving to wild sources. In the mid-1990s, scientists reported that Bt corn was killing
Monarch butterﬂies, an endangered species. The report was highly plausible, given that Bt toxins are gen-
erally eﬀective against Lepidopterans, including Monarch butterﬂies.216 Follow up research has indicated
that this eﬀect is unlikely to have a signiﬁcant impact on Monarch butterﬂy populations.217 Other concerns
have been expressed about the level of Bt toxin produced in the roots of some transgenic plant varieties.
The Bt toxin is reported to accumulate in the soil, and it is unclear whether there will be a deleterious eﬀect
on the soil ecosystem.218 Another possibility, analogous to the herbicide resistant plants is the pesticide
resistant insect. In fact, Bt resistant insects have been reported, raising fears that the Bt toxin will decline
in eﬀectiveness.219 Farmers do not want to enter an arms race similar to that seen in the area of antibiotics,
where bacteria are developing resistance to many of the widely used antibiotics, forcing doctors to rely on
less desirable second line antibiotics.
Possible environmental hazards caused by pharm plants cannot be ruled out. As noted by the NRC, scientists
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44have limited ability to predict such risks. In addition, the diversity of diﬀerent proteins that may be expressed
in pharm plants is likely to mean that a regulatory agency will have a diﬃcult time performing a thorough
analysis on each new transgenic plant.
V. The Case for Monitoring: Managing the Unpredictable
Given that there are residual environmental and food allergy risks that will be diﬃcult to assess in a pre-
market review, the behavior of pharm plants and their transgenes should be monitored in the ﬁeld.
The NRC conducted an assessment of the environmental risks posed by transgenic plants.220 NRC con-
cluded that pre-market testing would have limited predictive power, and that therefore a prudent post-
commercialization monitoring system would be appropriate.221 In support of monitoring, NRC noted that
pre-market testing tends to be done on a small scale, and is therefore unable to detect subtle or low frequency
events that become apparent on a larger scale; this point is equally applicable to the issue of food allergies,
where it is well-known that relatively small populations tend to suﬀer from any one food allergy.222 Further-
more, NRC noted that without any monitoring system it is impossible to verify the accuracy of assessments
made in an initial risk assessment.223
In the case of pharm plants, there is an expectation that conﬁnement systems should be designed to limit
the likelihood of mixing with the food supply, but as noted above, such mixing is nearly inevitable. If there
is no system in place to detect the presence of pharm transgenes, it will be impossible to determine whether
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45any mixing has occurred. In retrospect, perhaps the most startling aspect of the StarLink story occurred
at the outset. The ﬁrst discovery of StarLink corn in the food supply was made by a non-proﬁt group, not
the regulatory agency, and not private industry. It does not appear that USDA or anyone involved in the
cultivation or sale of Starlink corn was even trying to detect the possible ﬂow of Starlink corn into the food
chain. The permit issued by EPA did not require any monitoring of StarLink gene ﬂow. One must assume
that, but for Genetically Engineered Food Alert, the presence of Starlink corn in the food supply would
never have been detected. The StarLink experience highlights a seemingly obvious principle: if there is no
program to assess the spread of a transgenic crop after it is planted in the ﬁeld, no one will perceive such
a spread. A transgenic crop does not announce itself, and in most instances transgenic crops do not carry
obvious markers that would allow one to detect their presence by visual inspection.
A monitoring system should be designed to provide a reasonable probability of detecting any movement
of pharm transgenes into food crops and the food supply. The technology that would be used in such
a monitoring system has already been developed. In response to the demand for transgene-free grain in
Europe and Japan, the American food supply has begun to develop segregation and identity preservation
systems that allow tracking of various transgenic food crops as they move from the farmer to the grain
elevator and ultimately to the exporter or the processors. Recently enacted regulations in the European
Union will require certiﬁcation of less than one percent transgenic content in any imported grain. A number
of new companies have been formed to provide agricultural genetic testing services. Thus the capability to
monitor for the presence of transgene from pharm plants is already developed.
The NRC acknowledged that monitoring can be prohibitively expensive224, and the U.S. food industry has
made a similar complaint with respect to the new EU requirements. A monitoring program intended to
224Id. at 192.
46prevent the undetected movement of pharm transgenes need not be as comprehensive as an industry-wide
identity preservation system. Periodic checks in the vicinity of ﬁeld test sites may be suﬃcient. Additionally,
government agencies may be able to assist in developing and implementing a monitoring system, although
decisions about what party should bear the cost of regulation is a matter of legislative policy. Government
agencies were instrumental during the StarLink incident. EPA was able to work with private companies to
develop tests for the Cry9C gene and protein. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
(GIPSA) developed a “dipstick” test for rapid use by parties involved in the movement and storage of corn,
and particular for those needing to certify GM-free status for export. GIPSA announced in 2002 that it
would begin a voluntary testing program for transgenic grains.225 GIPSA has developed a variety of testing
protocols for transgenic grains and conducts a validation program whereby laboratories that oﬀer tracking
services can evaluate their accuracy through a GIPSA program.226 The cooperation of government and
private entities should facilitate an eﬃcient monitoring program.
The Guidelines issued by FDA, EPA and USDA recommend at least minimal eﬀorts to facilitate detection
of engineered plants. The Guidelines suggest that bioengineered pharmaceutical plant lines be designed
so as to have an altered appearance relative to food plants, listing strategies such as novel colors or leaf
patterns or including auxotrophic markers that could be used to identify the transgenic plants under speciﬁc
growth conditions.227 The guidelines also say, “We strongly recommend that you have tests available that
can detect the presence of the target gene and the protein product in the raw agricultural commodity.”228
These recommendations should be made mandatory, where possible.
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47Lastly, a monitoring system would provide data with regards to the eﬀectiveness of containment systems.
If relatively simple containment systems prove, over a span of years, to be completely eﬀective, it may be
possible to scale back on other aspects of premarket safety review and resort only to the validated containment
system coupled with the monitoring.
A carefully designed monitoring program will function to alert authorities to the inappropriate spread of
transgenes, provide information on the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent containment measures, and help detect and
manage unexpected events.
VI. A New Regulatory System for Pharm Plants
The present regulatory system is not well-suited to manage the risks associated with pharm plants. The
present system depends solely on mandated containment requirements, although individual developers may
seek the beneﬁt of a voluntary FDA review. However, the optional nature of that review means that FDA
is unlikely to demand or receive the same quality of information. The experiences with ﬁrst generation
transgenic plants and the ProdiGene plants demonstrate that physical and farmer-dependent containment
systems are not reliable, and some level of commingling with the food supply is quite likely. Furthermore,
it is unclear how such commingling will be detected, apart from the occasional inspections made by APHIS
agents. While inspections may be eﬀective, there is no plan for monitoring the presence of pharm transgenes
in crops and grain elevators in regional proximity to the pharm crops. Therefore it will be impossible, under
the present system to determine whether pharm crops and genes have entered the food supply. Even worse,
if people begin to evince unusual illnesses, it will be nearly impossible to trace those symptoms to a pharm
plant or transgene.
48An improved regulatory structure would include the following features:
1.
A pre-market review of each new pharm plant229 with respect to food safety and
environmental safety;
2.
A permitting process that would mandate containment measures commensurate
with environmental and food safety risks. Any pharm plant with an identiﬁably increased
risk would need to have a failsafe containment system, meaning containment that would en-
sure no commingling with the food supply and/or wild plants, depending on the risk proﬁle; and
3.
A monitoring system that would allow the detection of spreading pharm plants
and transgenes, and that would provide baseline information that could be used to correlate
unexpected events to the presence of pharm plants.
The expertise for this system is already developed. FDA would perform food safety review, much as it does
for food additives. APHIS would perform the environmental assessment and conduct the permitting process,
as it already does. APHIS could coordinate the monitoring program, drawing on expertise from industry
and from GIPSA.
49The authority to establish parts (2) and (3) is derived from the Plant Protection Act, which allows APHIS
to administer a ﬁeld permit program and to conduct inspections.
The authority to establish part (1) is not entirely clear. FDA could make approval of plant-grown pharma-
ceutical products contingent upon the developer submitting to a food safety review, however such a program,
if formalized in a rule, might be beyond the scope of granted power. Alternatively, FDA could determine
that pharm plants are “reasonably expected to become food” and are therefore unapproved food additives.
FDA could support such a ﬁnding with the extensive body of evidence showing the ease with which trans-
genes move through the system. A developer might be able to avoid this type of jurisdiction by selecting
a biological containment system that ensures that there is no possibility of mixing with the food supply,
perhaps by electing a non-food plant. It would then be appropriate to exempt the manufacturer from FDA
food safety review.
Agricultural biotechnology companies would beneﬁt from a more stringent regulatory system. If pharm
plants are approved for low level contamination in food, an incident of escape would not inevitably result in
the condemnation of large quantities of food, as happened in the StarLink and ProdiGene situations. The
ProdiGene and StarLink incidents have done great damage to the credibility of the transgenic plant industry
as a whole. Bradley Shurdut, who leads government and regulatory aﬀairs for biotechnology at Dow Agro-
sciences said, at a symposium on the subject, “We need regulations tough and we need them transparent.
We have and continue to work with government to move this thing forward quickly and in a way that is
comprehensive, so we are willing to raise the bar.”230 The scientiﬁc uncertainty and high economic stakes
associated with transgenic crops have already taken a toll on the ﬁrst generation transgenic plants. Faced
with impenetrable problems in assessing risk and millions of dollars at stake, many farmers and governing
bodies have embraced an outright ban the open ﬁeld growth of transgenic plants.
230Pharming Symposium, supra note 8.
50Monsanto is attempting to win regulatory approval for widespread cultivation of Roundup Ready wheat in
Canada and the U.S.231 This will be the ﬁrst transgenic wheat to be widely grown, and industry participants
are expressing great reluctance. Wheat pollen is reported to drift and outcross at distances of up to forty
miles depending on the variety tested, but beyond distances of ten miles, outcrossing is a very low probability
event.232 A survey of North Dakota grain elevators revealed that 98% of operators were “very concerned”
or “somewhat concerned” about the proposed introduction.233 The Montana State Senate has considered a
bill requiring that transgenic wheat will be introduced only when the grain is accepted by major customers.
In the summer of 2002, the United Nations World Food Programme projected that 7 million of Zimbabwe’s
12.5 million citizens were facing severe food shortages. Yet Zimbabwe turned away a shipment of 10,000 tons
of corn from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).234 Zimbabwean oﬃcials
expressed concern that the shipment contained transgenic corn, even though it was identical to grain that
had been consumed in the U.S. for six years with no reported ill eﬀects.235
In California, Marin County is considering a referendum to ban the growth of any transgenic crops within
the borders.
If the industry does not heed these warning signs and push to establish a credible, highly eﬀective regulatory
system, pharm plants may likewise face outright bans, even in the United States.
231Bringing New Technologies to Wheat: Information on the Development of Roundup Ready r  Wheat. Monsanto, Inc.
Accessed April 15, 2004 at ttp://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/content/sci tech/literature/techpubs/2003/wheat.pdf.
232Van Acker, supra note 129.
233Grain Elevator Operators Resist Transgenic Wheat, April 16, 2003. Reported by Organic Consumers Association and
accessed at www.organicconsumers.org/wheat/transgenic wheat.cfm. 317 grain elevators were surveyed, 52 responses were
received.
234Andrew Meldrum, The Guardian, June 1, 2002.
235Id.
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